This paper develops a view of exchange rate policy as a trade-off between the desire to smooth fluctuations in real exchange rates so as to reduce distortions in consumption allocations, and the need to allow flexibility in the nominal exchange rate so as to facilitate terms of trade adjustment. We show that optimal nominal exchange rate volatility will reflect these competing objectives. The key determinants of how much the exchange rate should respond to shocks will depend on the extent and source of price stickiness, as well as the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. Quantitatively, we find the optimal exchange rate volatility should be significantly less than would be inferred based solely on terms of trade considerations. Moreover, we find that the relationship between price stickiness and optimal exchange rate volatility may be non-monotonic.
This paper develops a novel view of exchange rate policy as a trade-off between the desire to smooth fluctuations in real exchange rates in order to achieve smaller cross-country deviations in consumer prices on the one hand, and the need to allow flexibility in the nominal exchange rate so as to facilitate terms of trade adjustment on the other hand.
There is a substantial body of empirical evidence establishing that the link between movements in exchange rates and changes in national consumer prices is weak. 1 One explanation for this weak link is that prices of all goods are sticky in local currencies (LCP, or local currency pricing), and do not respond to movements in the exchange rate. In this case, nominal exchange rate fluctuations lead to inefficient movements in real exchange rates because they alter relative prices of identical or similar goods across countries. From this perspective, it is desirable to avoid movements in exchange rates because they lead to differences in prices across countries for goods that have similar resource costs.
2
But there is separate evidence that relative traded goods prices are linked to movements in exchange rates. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) show that exchange rates are highly correlated with the terms of trade, measured as the relative price of imports to exports. This suggests that exported goods tend to have prices set in the producer's currency (PCP, or producer's currency pricing), and a depreciation raises the relative price of foreign to home export goods. In this case, the exchange rate may play a role in facilitating relative price adjustment in face of country specific shocks when nominal prices of traded goods are slow to adjust to the shocks.
We present an analysis of exchange rate policy when there is a conflict between the objectives of stabilizing consumption based real exchange rates and allowing terms of trade adjustment. We build a model consistent with both the evidence of weak exchange rate pass-1 See Engel (1993 Engel ( , 1999 , Rogers and Jenkins (1996) , Rogers (1996, 2001 ), Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) , and Wei (2001, 2003 ). Mussa's (1986) classic paper stimulated much of this research. 2 find that if exporters set prices according to LCP, a fixed exchange rate regime is the optimal monetary policy. Similar results are found in Corsetti and Pesenti (2002). through to consumer goods prices, but high pass-through to imported goods prices. In the model, imports and exports are intermediate goods. The law of one price holds for these traded products, so nominal price stickiness of these goods is of the PCP variety. Intermediate goods are used to produce final consumer goods, whose prices are sticky in the consumers' currency.
Consistent with the evidence, consumer prices are unresponsive to nominal exchange rate changes. In general, optimal exchange rate movements in this setting do not deliver full terms of trade adjustment. There is a trade-off. Nominal exchange rate movement changes the terms of trade in the desired direction when there is a real shock, as the literature has suggested, but mimicking the optimal terms of trade change may imply undesirable changes in the consumption real exchange rate.
In our model, the optimal real exchange rate is constant. Although consumer goods are non-traded in the model, final goods are produced using traded inputs for which the law of one price holds. Under LCP for final goods, nominal exchange rate changes induce movements in real exchange rates that lead to inefficient consumption allocations. Stabilization of the consumption real exchange rate is a legitimate goal of exchange-rate policy, but it conflicts with the objective of achieving terms of trade adjustment.
The models are of course a simplified version of reality, and realistically optimal real exchange rates may not be constant. If there are changes in the prices of pure non-traded goods, for example, real exchange rates optimally should respond. By using a model in which optimal real exchange rates are constant, we highlight the role of monetary policy in eliminating inefficient real exchange rate movements that occur when fluctuating nominal exchange rates and LCP induce deviations in prices of consumer goods across locations 3 .
Evidence that the law of one price holds relatively well for traded intermediate goods is consistent with PCP, but is also consistent with nominal price flexibility for these goods. The evidence is not refined enough to distinguish between the two possibilities. Markets for intermediate inputs are not the standard "customer" markets to which models of nominal price stickiness are typically applied. To the extent that traded intermediate prices are flexible, exchange rate adjustment is not needed to adjust the terms of trade because the nominal prices themselves can adjust.
Additionally, domestically produced products might generally be poor substitutes for imported intermediate goods. For example, Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) , Rebelo (2002, 2003) , and Corsetti and Dedola (2003) all model final traded consumption goods as being produced using a Leontief production technology that combines the imported intermediate with a domestic distribution service in fixed proportions. If the substitutability of imported intermediates with domestic goods and services is low, the expenditure-switching role of exchange rates may be secondary. It is the short-run elasticity of substitution that is relevant for exchange-rate policy: when nominal prices have had time to adjust, the real effects of nominal exchange rate changes dissipate. It is well known that the short-run elasticity of substitution for imports is quite low. Even if prices are sticky and set according to PCP, so that nominal exchange rate movements do change the relative price of imported goods, there will be little expenditure switching when substitutability is low.
We first present a series of special cases where monetary policy can achieve a first-best outcome -stabilizing the consumption real exchange rate as well as supporting efficient terms of trade adjustment. In our first specification, nominal prices of consumer goods are set in advance of the realization of shocks, while prices of intermediate goods are taken to be perfectly flexible.
We find that an optimal monetary policy should maintain a fixed exchange rate. The only goal of policy is to achieve real exchange rate stability since nominal price movement of intermediate exports allows the terms of trade to adjust optimally.
We then reverse the assumptions on stickiness -final goods prices are flexible, but intermediate goods prices are set in advance in the producer's currency. Here we find that optimal exchange rate policy is aimed purely at achieving the desired terms of trade adjustment, since flexible final goods prices will ensure a stable real exchange rate. This specification is, of course, at odds with the evidence of non-responsiveness of consumer prices to exchange rate movements.
The model we consider is based very closely on that of Obstfeld (2001 show, arises because of two knife-edge assumptions that nullify the distortion caused by real exchange rate fluctuations.
We also solve a version of the model in which the home and foreign inputs must be combined in fixed proportions. We show -in stark contrast to the Obstfeld (2001) result --that fixed exchange rates are optimal when both intermediate and final goods prices are fixed in advance (with PCP for intermediates and LCP for final goods.) There is no expenditureswitching role for exchange rates when there is no substitutability between imports and domestically-produced goods.
In general, however, monetary policy will not be able simultaneously to attain fully consumption allocations as well as optimal terms of trade adjustment. In particular, when both final goods prices and intermediate goods prices are partially sticky, this will be the case (except when there is zero substitution between home and foreign inputs in production). We go on to present a quantitative analysis of the more general case where there is a real trade-off between these goals. Our analysis finds that when consumer price indices are unresponsive to exchange rate changes, an optimal monetary policy will limit exchange rate volatility substantially relative to that required to achieve terms of trade volatility in a frictionless economy -even when most or all intermediate goods prices are sticky in nominal terms. We find that optimal exchange rate volatility is never more than 50 percent of terms of trade volatility in a frictionless model. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the basic model structure and solves for a flexible price equilibrium. Section 2 analyzes a series of cases under alternative assumptions about price setting and substitution possibilities. Section 3 analyzes the more general case. Some brief conclusions follow.
The Model
The model is a static, two-country model with tradable intermediate goods and nontraded final consumption goods. The model's structure is very similar to that of Obstfeld (2001) . We examine a static model in order to focus on the static distortions sticky prices introduce as they interfere with terms of trade adjustment and real exchange rate equilibrium. The two countries, home and foreign, are populated by a continuum of households of measure 1. Each household owns and operates a firm producing a unique variety of intermediate good, using the household's labor as input. In each country, a final goods sector assembles consumption goods using home and foreign intermediates. Final goods are not traded internationally.
1a. Model Structure
Household i in the home country has preferences given by:
C is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregate over a continuum of home-produced final good commodities with an elasticity of substitution of 1 , with the production function: 
1.b A Flexible Price Model
We first outline a flexible-price version of the model. Since our primary interest is in asking how sticky prices influence optimal exchange rate policy, we wish to eliminate any other sources of inefficiency that are not directly related to price stickiness. One distortion arises due to monopoly pricing wedges in both intermediate and final goods sectors. To avoid these, we assume that firms receive a per unit subsidy on production so as to ensure that price would equal marginal cost at both the intermediate and final goods level if all prices were fully flexible. The subsidy is financed by lump sum profit taxes on the firms.
A second issue is the nature of international capital markets. Again, to focus exclusively on the constraints that are related to nominal rigidities, we assume that agents can engage in exante cross country trade in a full set of nominal state contingent assets. This ensures that if all prices were flexible, full cross-country risk sharing would obtain. In a later section, we explore how our results would change if these assets markets did not exist.
Rather than explicitly introducing a role for money in the model, we simply define monetary policy as a rule that targets the value of nominal consumption in each country. This is consistent with a variety of alternative underlying models of money, such as money in the utility function, or a cash-in-advance specification 4 . 
The marginal utility of a dollar for any home household is C P demand of home and foreign final goods firms. Finally, equation (7) defines the monetary policy rule for the home economy, where represents the target nominal consumption.
Equation (3), (4), (6) and (7) have counterparts for the foreign country, determining foreign final goods prices, prices of foreign intermediate goods, foreign market clearing, and the foreign monetary policy rule. The unit cost function for the foreign final good is of identical form to that for the home firm, and may be written as
H F c P S P . These equations for the home and foreign economy, together with equation (5), may be solved for the equilibrium values of , and . Table 1 we may derive the equilibrium of the flexible price model as follows 7 .
With all prices flexible, and final goods production technologies identical across countries, from (6) and its foreign counterpart we see that purchasing power parity (PPP) always holds. The risk-sharing condition (5) them implies that consumption is equalized across countries. The flexible price equilibrium for consumption is written as:
A decline in labor supply in either country (an increase in K or K*) will reduce desired output, and reduce equilibrium consumption in both countries. The flexible price equilibrium levels of output (or employment) may be derived as:
An equal shock to labor supply in both countries will reduce consumption and output proportionally. But a country specific labor supply shock reduces a country's output more than in proportion to the fall in consumption. Relative output may then be written as:
(10)
Relative output is inversely proportional to the country specific labor supply shocks.
Finally, we may define the terms of trade
(11)
A negative foreign labor supply shock (an increase in K*) raises the relative price of foreign to home output.
Expressions (8)- (11) set out the goals for optimal monetary policy in environments with sticky prices. The monetary policy should attempt to equalize consumption across countries, but also tilt employment (and production) towards the country with the lowest labor supply shock.
In order to do this, the monetary policy must affect the total level of world spending, and the composition of spending between home and foreign intermediate goods. To achieve the latter, policy would have to change relative prices. But the movement in relative prices may be in conflict with the desire to equalize consumption across countries, in a situation where purchasing power parity fails due to local currency pricing.
Exchange Rate Policy under Sticky Prices
Our aim is to explore the consequences of alternative types of nominal rigidities for optimal monetary and exchange rate policy, using as a benchmark the flexible price equilibrium.
We will abstract from strategic interactions between monetary policy makers. While interesting in itself, the issue of policy coordination is not directly relevant to the questions we are addressing. Implicitly, we are focusing on cooperative monetary policy rules.
In general, both the prices of intermediate goods as well as final goods may be sticky, although empirically we feel that final goods prices are much more likely to be sticky. We assume that a measure ω of final goods producers in both countries set their prices in advance (in local currency), and the measure ( When final goods prices are sticky, the home country price set by any final goods producer may be written as:
This replaces equation (3) in Table 1 . This pricing function is derived from the problem of the final good firm that maximizes discounted profits, given that an optimal production subsidy is offered. For each realization of and , equations (4), (6), and (7), along with their counterparts of the foreign economy, along with equation (5), determine
and . Given the distribution of consumption, prices and exchange rates, equations (3') and its foreign counterpart determine and .
S P
In what way does the economy with sticky final goods prices depart from the flexible price equilibrium? The first thing to note is that the equilibrium terms of trade are identical to those of the flexible price equilibrium. To see this, use (4), (10), and the foreign counterparts, with (5), to establish that:
which is equivalent to (11). Hence, independent of monetary policy, relative prices adjust efficiently in an economy with sticky final goods prices but flexible intermediate goods prices.
However, output levels will not in general be efficient, since total demand depends on monetary policy, given sticky final goods prices. From the monetary policy rules (7), we see that final goods prices cannot in general always be at the level consistent with the flexible price equilibrium, unless and are designed appropriately. More formally, we can establish * Proposition 1. If monetary policies follow the rules given by:
where and * are arbitrary constant parameters, then the equilibrium with sticky final goods prices coincides with the flexible price equilibrium, with P = and * * P = .
Proof: See Appendix.
The proposition ensures that PPP holds, since the monetary rules combined with (5) imply that
, and consumption is equalized across countries at its flexible price equilibrium level. But since final goods prices are state independent, then the exchange rate must also be state independent. These monetary policies achieve efficient consumption allocations in all states of the world because they keeps the real exchange rate fixed at unity. But with sticky final goods prices in local currency, PPP can only be achieved by fixing the nominal exchange rate.
The optimal monetary policies eliminate the distortion due to sticky final goods prices.
An alternative way to see it is that the monetary rules stabilize marginal cost for final goods producers, so that equation (3) 
This condition says that when the intermediate producer must set their prices in advance, they trade off the expected marginal utility benefit of a price reduction in terms of greater sales, with the expected marginal utility cost in terms of greater work effort. An equilibrium of the model with sticky intermediate goods prices is defined by the values for and that solve (3), (6) (7) and their foreign counterparts, and (5), for each realization of .
may be solved from (4') and its foreign counterpart. Then, from (6), output in each country will be determined by: A fixed exchange rate would ensure consumption in the two countries is equal in all states, but by eliminating relative price adjustment, it would fail to sustain the desired rate of relative price adjustment. Production patterns would not be efficient. But there is a particular case where both objectives may be met, even when all prices are sticky. This is when domestic and foreign intermediates are perfect complements in production; that is, when 0 γ = . In this case, the production function (2) takes on a fixed proportions form. From (8) and (9), the flexible price equilibrium is:
where FP stands for `fixed proportions'.
In this case, the flexible price equilibrium would equalize not only consumption across countries, but also output levels. Since relative output is independent of shocks, we might guess that relative price adjustment is not a priority. Engel (2002) notes that the expenditureswitching role of exchange rate adjustment depends critically on the substitutability of inputs in production. When substitutability is low, then expenditure switching is not important. We have: Proof: See Appendix.
Since PPP is attained, the exchange rate is * S P P = = * , and state independent.
Again, a fixed exchange rate is necessary for efficient consumption allocations. This case has much of the same flavor of the recent models by Burstein, Neves, and
Rebelo (2003), Rebelo (2002, 2003) , and Corsetti and Dedola (2003) .
In those models, imports are combined in fixed proportions with a local nontradable (distribution services) to produce a nontraded final consumer good. The implications of terms of trade changes are similar in this model and those: terms of trade changes do not induce any substitution between home-produced and foreign-produced goods. Even though intermediate goods prices are sticky, the exchange rate is not needed for expenditure switching because no expenditure switching is required.
In considering empirically the size of this elasticity of substitution, we should focus on the short run. We are considering in this context the role of exchange rate movements as a method of ameliorating the distortions introduced by sticky prices. The horizon for such considerations is determined by the speed of adjustment of nominal prices. But the short-run elasticity of substitution of imported intermediate inputs is likely to be quite low.
8 Note that equation (11) indicates that the terms of trade will still respond to shocks when 0 γ = . But this is not allocative, since from (10), in this case, and therefore any monetary rule that targets overall world output can achieve the efficient outcome without any relative price change.
2b. No asset trade
So far, all our results pertain to an economy full state contingent asset trade. But perhaps a more realistic benchmark would have asset markets absent or limited. Do the same results carry over to such an environment? In this section we assume that risk sharing is limited to equity markets, and in addition, equity shares are historically given.
The budget constraint for the representative home household is: τ is a lump-sum tax or transfer from the government.
I
σ is a subsidy to production of the intermediate good that eliminates the distortion due to monopoly pricing, which is financed by the lump-sum tax. represents aggregate profits of domestic firms that sell final goods, and is the aggregate profit of foreign firms selling final goods. 9 Each domestic household holds a share Π * Π λ of home firms and a share 1 λ − of foreign firms. We impose the restriction that there not be complete home bias. 10 We take λ as given, so we do not model a pre-market in which portfolios are chosen. Again, we abstract from the monetary side of the economy, simply assuming a nominal consumption rule for the monetary policy as above.
We assume that the optimal subsidy on intermediate goods is set at ( 1)
and lump sum taxes are . We also assume that final goods producing firms are given subsidies to production
, and are levied with lump sum tax bills equal to (for the home firm) to finance this subsidy. As for the case with state contingent asset trade, this arrangement ensures that both intermediate good and final good pricing will be efficient in a flexible price equilibrium. will extend only for a unit of elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in production.
The intuition for this result is easy to see. When all prices are flexible, profits net of subsidies and taxes are zero, so we may write the budget constraint (18) as , which implies that: Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) .
have a differential impact on the wealth of home and foreign households. An increase in S raises the real value of profits for home households relative to foreign ones. This effect disappears, however, under the special assumption of 1 λ = , in which case foreign exchange rate changes have no wealth effects because all household portfolios are fully concentrated in ownership of local firms.
As (20) Nominal exchange rates must in general play the role of adjusting the terms of trade, but this objective competes with the need for exchange rate stability to stabilize CPI real exchange rates. These dual roles come into play in the models of Rogoff (2000, 2002) , , and Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) , in which only final goods are produced and traded. When the final goods are priced in the producers' currencies (PCP), then the law of one price holds. Eliminating law-of-one-price deviations is not a goal, and the objective of exchange rate policy is only to achieve the desired terms of trade. When final goods are priced in consumers' currencies (LCP), exchange rate changes are completely ineffective at influencing the relative price of home and foreign goods for consumers in either country. But exchange rate stability is needed to avoid unwarranted deviations from the law of one price -so perfectly fixed exchange rates are optimal. We now let ω (the measure of final goods producers who set their prices in advance, in the consumer's currency), and (the measure of intermediate goods producers who set prices in advance in the producer's currency) fall between zero and one. Empirically, our prior would be that κ ω κ > , but we do not impose this in the simulations.
The General Trade-off between Terms of Trade adjustment and Deviations from PPP
In a symmetric equilibrium, the price index for final goods is written as
where a indicates the price of a good that is set in advance, and indicates the ex-post flexible price. The flexible price is just equal to marginal cost, as before, whereas is defined by the condition:
which differs from (6) due to the fact that the aggregate price index is now stochastic. P
The intermediate good price index is:
( )
where again, ˆH P is the sticky price of the intermediate good, and ˆH P is the flexible price. The flexible price intermediate is set as:
where the term inside the parentheses on the right hand side indicates that the relative price of fixed to flexible-price intermediate goods affects the composition of demand facing price setters.
The sticky price of the intermediate good is written as:
The risk sharing condition (5) is written as before, while the market clearing condition for output of the intermediate good is written as:
* * * * *1
(1 ) (1 ) 2
where we define
as the aggregate price index for intermediate goods.
An equivalent set of conditions may be written for the foreign economy.
An optimal monetary policy in this model is aimed at eliminating three types of distortions. First, as before, there is an inefficiency due to the failure of PPP, which leads to distorted consumption allocations. Second, there is an inefficiency due to the lack of adjustment of the terms of trade (the relative price of the home and foreign intermediate) to the labor supply shocks. Finally, there is a new inefficiency coming from the fact that with some intermediate good prices set in advance, production levels will differ across sticky price and flexible price intermediate goods firms.
An optimal monetary rule cannot eliminate all these inefficiencies simultaneously, except in the special cases of the previous section. Moreover, it is not possible to characterize the optimal monetary policies analytically in this more general case. Rather, we solve the model numerically, choosing the monetary policy that maximizes expected utility for a given calibration of parameter values and distribution of labor supply shocks.
The model is entirely symmetric, so that home and foreign expected utility are identical when monetary policies are identically chosen across countries. As in the previous section, we abstract from issues of strategic interaction across policy makers and derive an optimal policy rule that maximizes an equal-weighted sum of home and foreign expected utilities.
As emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) , when shocks are global there is no need for terms of trade change or exchange rate adjustment. Hence, we focus only on country specific labor supply shocks, so that K+K* is constant. Moreover, we assume a two-state distribution of across the two countries, where K is either high or low, and normalize so that the standard deviation of the terms of trade in the flexible price economy is unity. In the benchmark version of the model, we assume that little responsiveness of final goods prices to exchange rates, Figure 1 suggests that an optimal monetary policy involves much less exchange rate adjustment than would be desired in an economy with full exchange rate pass-through. Hence, the main message of the previous section continues to apply in the extended model: when prices are sticky in local currency, an optimal monetary policy implies less exchange rate flexibility than would be inferred from the traditional pricing model with full pass-through to consumer prices (and PPP). Moreover, despite local currency price stickiness in final goods, this is a model where there is a substantial expenditureswitching role for the exchange rate in production, since there is full exchange rate pass-through at the intermediate good level.
In Figure 1 , the relationship between κ and exchange rate volatility is concave. As intermediate goods prices become more and more sticky (for a given degree of price rigidity in final goods), exchange rate volatility increases, but at a diminishing rate. As tends to unity, the gain from terms of trade adjustment in response to exchange rate changes is offset by the costs in terms of reduced consumption risk sharing. In fact, the numerical solution shows that the optimal monetary rules are effectively independent of movements in , for values of degree to which exchange rate volatility under an optimal policy is sensitive to the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ . As ρ increases, consumption differentials become less sensitive to real exchange rates. As a result, optimal exchange rate volatility increases: more terms of trade adjustment can be achieved for a given degree of consumption risk sharing. and terms of trade adjustment. As κ κ increases, the optimal rule allows more and more deviations of the terms of trade form its flexible price equilibrium in return for a given deviation in consumption risk sharing. This mirrors the fact that the optimal exchange rate volatility in Figure 1 is a concave function of . As the fraction of intermediate goods prices that are preset increases more and more, the monetary authority is less and less willing to allow an increase κ in exchange rate volatility. Of course, when the intermediate goods production elasticity of substitution is very small, these loci would be backward bending, for the same reasons that we obtain the hump-shaped relationship in Figure 2 .
Conclusions
There is a large body of evidence establishing that pass-through from changes in exchange rates to consumer goods prices is weak or non-existent. When this is the case, exchange rate fluctuations automatically move around consumption-based real exchange rates. This paper has identified this trade-off and explored its nature, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In some cases, we show that a welfare evaluation of the trade-off gives a significant emphasis on exchange rate stability. Quantitatively, we find that exchange rate volatility should be significantly less than that which would be inferred based on models that focus exclusively on the expenditure-switching role of exchange rates. Table 1 The consumption index, C, from equation (1) is given by:
Appendix A. Derivation of conditions in
where is the consumption of variety j. The aggregate price index is then given by:
Minimizing subject to (A1), and using the equilibrium condition
gives demand for the firm's product:
Aggregate profits of home final goods firms are given by , where 
. Households i's budget constraint under complete markets is given by
where the z index refers to the state (and, as previously, i to the household) , and 1 1 The first order conditions for the household I's choice of state contingent consumption and price, given the demand for household I's good from (A3) above, are given by:
Putting these two equations together, and imposing symmetry, so that all households in the home country set identical prices of intermediates, gives equation (4) in Table 1 . Equation (5) is obtained by using the identical equation to (A6) for the foreign country, along with the assumption of ex ante equality, so that the Lagrange multipliers are identical across the two countries. Finally, the market clearing equations (6) is obtained by using (A2), (A3) and (A4), aggregated across goods, again using the symmetry assumption that all home final goods prices are equal, and all home intermediate goods prices are equal. Condition (7) in Table 1 is just the assumed monetary policy rule.
Appendix B. Proof of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1
Using the monetary policies (13), and the market clearing equation (6), and its foreign counterpart, in equation (4) From the pricing equations again, we can establish that the equilibrium pre-set prices satisfy . This implies that PPP and full consumption risk sharing hold. Then, from equations (6) and (7), both consumption and output are at their flexible price levels, given that the terms of trade is equal to its flexible price level. Then, using the definitions of τ and C , we may establish that a), the right hand side of (B7) is state independent, and b) H P = . Hence, the monetary policy rules (15) 
Proof of Proposition 3.
From (5), with the monetary policies (17), and given that P and are predetermined, the exchange rate is predetermined. With fixed proportions, and given that , 
